As Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are usually deployed in remote or even hostile environment, the adoption of security mechanism is fundamental. To achieve secure communication between sensor nodes in WSNs, it is important to establish efficient key predistribution schemes. Unfortunately, key management scheme is a challenging issue for WSNs because of the resource limitations in the sensor nodes. In this paper, we propose an efficient key management scheme for WSNs, which assigns the key spaces to sensor nodes via combinatorial design. In the scheme Finite Projective Plane is mapped to obtain efficient key distribution scheme. Connectivity, resistance against attacks, storage and communication overhead are studied analytically and computationally. Compared to related schemes, the proposed scheme performs better against compromised node attacks.
Introduction
Nowadays, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are increasingly used in many applications like habit monitoring, health care, military or security areas [1, 2] . Since sensor nodes often reside in unattended or hostile environment, particularly with military applications, an adversary could easily access the wireless channel and intercept the transmitted information, or distribute false information in WSN. Under such circumstances, authentication and confidentiality should be undergone to ensure integrity of sensor node and proper functionality of the network. This requires the establishment of secure keys between sensor nodes in the WSNs [3] . Key management can be defined as a set of process and mechanisms that support key establishment and maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between valid parties according to a security policy. The design and implementation of any security service for WSNs must keep in mind that compared with conventional computers for the low-cost sensor nodes have limited energy supply and stringent capabilities. For key management it is not feasible for WSNs to use traditional pairwise key establishment techniques such as public key cryptography and key distribution center (KDC) [4, 5] .
Generally speaking, key management protocols are based on either symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic functions. However due the resource limitation in the sensor nodes, use of public cryptographic (asymmetric functions) is not suitable. Generally, there are two types of symmetric key management schemes based on ondemand trust center or key predistribution. However, as there is no an infrastructure in WSNs, the former schemes are not suitable to be used in WSNs. With the key predistribution schemes, key materials are distributed among all sensor nodes before the network deployment. In this regard, various key predistribution schemes have been proposed for key management in WSNs. resilience to node captures. With the advantages of the combinatorial design, this scheme has higher local connectivity than the Multiple-Space Key Predistribution scheme(MSKPD) [9] . And this scheme will perform better security than MSKPD scheme under the same local connectivity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview on matrix-based key establishment schemes, followed by some basics on combinatorial designs which will be which will be used in designing the key predistribution scheme. Section 3 describes our propose protocol in details. Section 4 describes the performances of our scheme, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background

Matrix-Based Key Establishment Schemes
In [10] , Blom proposed a key establishment scheme that allows each pair of sensor nodes to establishment a common key. In this scheme, there are two matrices over F(q): a public (λ+1)×n matrices M and a secret (λ+1)×(λ+1) symmetric random matrix D. These matrices are used to compute the symmetric n×n matrix K=(DM) T M, whose element K ij =K ji , corresponds to the key between sensor nodes i and j. During the key predistribution scheme, each senor node i is loaded with col i , the i-th column of matrix M , which is used as public information; each node also receives row i, the i-th row of matrix (DM) T , which is kept private.
After deployment, all sensor nodes broadcast their column instances of M, allowing any pair of sensor node i and j to compute K ij =row i ×col j =row j ×col i . This scheme is λ secure, which means that an attacker who captures up to λ sensor nodes is unable to recover link keys from any other sensor nodes. However if more than λ sensor nodes are compromised all keys can be recovered.
Blom scheme has some attractive properties. As it allow the creation pairwise keys, the deployment of sensor node authentication and revocation functionalities are made easier. Additionally, the scheme provides perfect key connectivity and its resilience can be adjusted by choosing an adequate λ parameter. However, the larger the size of λ ,the larger become the message broadcast, the storage requirements and the complexity of the vector multiplication involved in this solution. Thus, one has to choose the adequate trade-off between security and efficiency.
Du et al., [9] proposed the Multiple-Space Key Predistribution(MSKPD), which is a combination of the random key generation schem [7] and Blom's Scheme [10] in order to improve the resilience of the last solution without increasing λ. The resulting Multiple-Space Key Pre-Distribution Scheme employs a (λ+1)×N matrices D i , 1≤i≤ω, which define a set of w spaces (D i , M).During Key Pre-distribution, every sensor j is loaded with the jth column of M (i.e., col j ); additionally, for τ(1≤τ≤ω) randomly chosen spaces (D i , M), node j is loaded with the i-th row from the corresponding matrices (D i M)T( i.e., the nodes receives τ IDs of the spaces it carries. If two neighboring nodes share a common space, the can establish a pairwise key using Blom's Scheme; otherwise, a common key can be generated using the Basic Scheme's Path-key Establishment protocol. According to the authors' analysis, the Multiple-Space Key Predistribution schemes present a very good resilience.
Basics on Combinatorial Design
Definition 1: A combinatorial design is a pair (X, A), where A is a set of subsets of X, called blocks. The elements of X are called varieties. A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) is an arrangement of v district object into b blocks such that each block contains exactly k distinct objects, each object occurs in exactly r different blocks, and every pair of distinct objects occurs together in exactly τ blocks. The design can be expressed as (v, k, τ), where: τ(v-1)=r(k-1) and bk=vr.
Definition 2:
A BIBD is called Symmetric BIBD or Symmetric Design when b=v and therefore v=k. A Symmetric Design has four properties: every block contains k=r elements; every element occurs in r=k blocks; every pair of elements occurs in τ blocks, and every pair of blocks intersects in τ elements. (7, 3, 1) , or equivalently (v,b,r,k,τ)=(7,7,3,3,1), Symmetric Design. Let S={ 1,2,3,4,5,6,7} be the set of |S|=v=7 objects. There are b=7 blocks and each bock contains k=3 objects. Every object occurs in r=3 blocks. Every pair of district objects occurs in τ=1 blocks and every pair of blocks intersects in τ=1 objects. The blocks of the Symmetric Design are:
In this paper, we are interested in a subset of Symmetric Designs, called a Finite Projective Plane. Definition 3: An (n 2 +n+1, n 2 +n+1,n+1,n+1, 1)-BIBD is called a Finite Projective Plane of order n. Finite projective plane consists of a finite set P of points and a set of subsets of P, called lines. For an integer n where n≥2, and n is a prime or prime-power. Finite Projective Place of order n has four properties:
we consider lines as blocks and points as objects, then a Finite Projective Place of order n is a Symmetric Design with Parameter(n 2 +n+1, n+1,1). An example of systematic design X= (7, 3, 1) 
The Proposed Scheme
In this subsection, we first describe how finite projective plane are used to assign key spaces to sensor nodes and then give the details of the proposed scheme.
Mapping from Finite Projective Plane to Key Space Distribution
In this work, we are interested in Finite Projective Plane of order n which is a BIBD with parameters( n 2 +n+1, n+1,1).
For a WSN, a Symmetric Design with b blocks is constructed by using a set S with |S|=v=b objects. That means b=v=n 2 +n+1 for a prime power n. Each object in S can be associated with a distinct key space and each block can be used as a group of key spaces. Each sensor node has t key spaces which are randomly selected from a set B of a group of key spaces. If two sensor nodes have a common key space they can generate a pairwise key by using this key space. Based on this, Table 1 gives the mapping form symmetric design to key distribution in our proposed protocol. In this section, we describe the proposed key predistribution scheme works in detail. The proposed scheme can be divided into three phases: key distribution phase, pairwise key establishment phase, and path key establishment phase.
Key Predistribution Phase
This phase is performed offline before the sensor nodes are deployed and includes the following steps.
Step 1: The setup server first selects a prime or prime-power n and constructs a symmetric design with b= n 2 +n+1 blocks by using a set S with v= n 2 +n+1 objects.
Step 2: The setup server generates |P|= n 2 +n+1 key spaces and uses the method in step 1 to divide these n 2 +n+1 key spaces into n 2 +n+1 key space groups. According to the properties of finite projective place, there are n+ 1 key spaces in each key space groups and any two key space groups have a common key space.
Step 3: Each sensor node picks one key space group from the n 2 +n+1 key space groups and then randomly selects t key spaces from this group as its preload key spaces. And then the sensor node loads the corresponding columns of these t matrixes to its memory.
Pairwise Key Establishment Phase and Path Key Establishment Phase
In the network bootstrap phase, each sensor node is required to broadcast the ID of key spaces in it. If they have a common key space, they can use it to generate the communication key as in [9] . If they share no common key space, they can use intermediate sensor nodes to generate the communication key.
Performance Analysis
In this section, the proposed scheme is analyzed, including network connectivity, resilience against node capture and performance overhead.
Local Connectivity
Local connectivity is defined as the probability that two neighboring nodes can establish can establish communication pairwise keys directly. Suppose there are two sensor node u and v in the WSNs. Let E(u, v) be the event that node u and v have at least one key space, then local connectivity P local =P(E(u,v)).
Suppose E 1 (u,v) be the event that node u and v pick the same group and E 2 (u, v) be the event that node u and v pick different groups. As there are n 2 +n+1 groups, we have
According to the property of the finite projective plane, we have
As the event E 1 (u,v) and E 2 (u,v) are two complementary events, We can get the local connectivity of node u and v as follows. Figure 1 shows the network local connectivity of the proposed scheme for different. It is also noted that the larger n is, the smaller the local connectivity is. And when the number of key spaces in sensor node is greater than or equal to n+1 the local connectivity is 1. That is that according to the property of Symmetric Design that any two blocks (lines) are surely have a common object or point. Figure 2 gives the local connectivity comparison of the MSKPD scheme and the proposed scheme. In the simulation, we assume that the key spaces in the key space International Journal of Security and Its Applications Vol. 9, No. 6 (2015) pool is 625(=25 2 +25+1) in (1) and 871(=29 2 +29+1) in (2) respectively. Figure 2 clearly shows that under the same situation the local connectivity of the proposed scheme is super to that of the MSKPD scheme. For two key predistribution schemes, the scheme with higher local connectivity will generally have a better security against node capture attack. This will be proved in the following subsection 4.2.2. 
Resilience against Node Capture
In this section, we evaluate how the proposed scheme improves the network security in terms of resilience against node capture. We compare our scheme with some existing schemes by calculating the fraction of compromised communication among non-compromised nodes.
Fraction of Compromised Network Communication:
Now we study the resiliency property of the proposed scheme against node compromise by calculating the fraction of communication keys in the network that are compromised due to key revealing resulted from captured nodes. Here, we calculate the probability the compromising the shared pairwise key between these two non-compromised sensor nodes when there are x sensor nodes have been captured.
Suppose K be the communication key used by two non-compromised sensor node u and v and L is the communication link between node u and v. Let S i denote the i-th polynomial (for i∈ {1, 2,…, n 2 +n+1}, and D i represent the joint event that K are computed by the polynomial S i and S i is compromised. We use the notation K∈S i to represent that "Key K was derived from the key K i ". When x nodes have been compromised, the probability of the communication key K been compromised is:
Since L uses only one key, the events 
As all events D i is equal probability likely, we have
Since the event
As K is derived from one key space and there are n 2 +n+1 key spaces, then
To facilitate the presentation, here we first give the following definition.
Definition 4:
The unsafe node of the first key space is the node that selects the key space group which contains the first key space. Now, we need to calculate 1 1 1 1
From formula (12) and (14), we can get 
Figure 3. Fraction of Compromised Communication between Noncompromsied Nodes versus Number of Compromised Nodes
Comparison with Related Work:
Here, To access how much is the improvements gained by the proposed scheme, we compare our scheme with EG scheme [7] , q-composite scheme (for q=2, 3) [8] , and MSKPD scheme [9] . Figure 4 (a)(b) clearly shows that our scheme has better security performances than that of EG schemes, q-composite scheme and MSKPD scheme. Taken as an example, the case in which P local =0.5, when an adversary compromise 400 sensor nodes compromised, about be 75% of links compromised between non-compromised sensors in EG scheme will be disclosed, 93.1% in q-composite (q=2), 99.2% in qcomposite (q=3), 99.5% in MSKPD scheme while there will only be 20% in our scheme. 
Storage and Communication Overhead
Storage overhead of our scheme is reasonable. Each sensor node of our scheme is associates with t key spaces, and for each key space, the node is loaded with the corresponding row of its matrix M. In addition, each node needs to remain the IDs of the key space. Assume the keys are chosen from a finite field q F and the IDs of sensor nodes are chosen from a finite field ' F q . Thus, the overall storage overhead is   ' log log ) 1 (t    bits; In terms of communication overhead, in the shared key discover phase each need to disclose of a list of t IDs to its neighbor nodes. Then the communication overhead of each node is ' log q t .
Conclusion
In this paper, an efficient new key management scheme based on Matrix and combinatorial design was proposed. The proposed approach uses finite projective plane to distribute the key space. With properties of the combinatorial design, the proposed scheme has a high local connectivity. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme has been demonstrated through analysis and comparison with other scheme.
